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INTRODUCTION
The question of the nature of the legal  authority  exercised  in  Malta  by  British  officials
prior to 1813 has been a rich source of debate and controversy. The moment  at  which  the
British officials had a legal power to exercise  full  legislative  and  executive  authority  is
elusive, despite its prominence as a seminal moment in Maltese constitutional history.
            It is true that, as far as United Kingdom (U.K.) constitutional law is concerned,  the
legal effects of conquest and cession are similar as regards the authority  of  the  Crown  to
legislate  for  an  acquired  territory.[1]  However,  this  principle   does   not   remove   the
importance of resolving which of these  possibilities  explains  British  authority  in  Malta
prior  to  1813.  Whether  legal  authority  arose  because  of  cession  or  conquest  matters
because, as  we  shall  discover,  the  events  on  which  these  alternative  possibilities  are
founded  occurred  at  different  times.  If,  for  example,  cession  explains  the  legal   and
constitutional authority of the British Crown in Malta, we need an explanation of the  legal
source of that authority prior to cession.
            It is proposed to revisit some of the arguments concerning  the  question  of  British
legal sovereignty over Malta, and thus the nature of the authority exercised by  the  British
Civil Commissioners who held office prior to Sir Thomas  Maitland.[2]  In  particular,  we
shall examine the moment at which sovereignty was acquired by the British, as well as  the
cause  of this transfer.
            The decision of the Privy Council in  Sammut  v  Strickland  [3]  made  it  a  settled
proposition of U.K. law that the ‘sovereignty’ of Malta had passed to the British Crown  at
least by October 1813.[4] This was the date of the first  appointment  of  a  British  official
with the title of ‘governor’  (Sir  Thomas  Maitland)  and  his  publication,  in  Malta,  of  a
Proclamation in the name and on  behalf  of  George  III  to  the  effect  that  the  King  had
determined ‘henceforth to recognise  the  people  of  Malta  and  Gozo  as  subjects  of  the
British  Crown  and  as  entitled  to  its  fullest  protection’.[5]  British   ‘sovereignty’   was
confirmed unambiguously in international  law  by  the  Treaty  of  Paris  1814[6]  and  the
subsequent Congress of Versailles 1815. However, the decision of  the  Privy  Council  did
not resolve the vexed question of the source of British authority between  1800  and  1813,
which continues to be a subject of speculation.
            The  Privy  Council  in  Sammut  v  Strickland  accepted  that  voluntary,  informal,
cession was recognised in United Kingdom law and that it had  the  same  legal  effects  as
formal cession; but doubted whether this was the case for Malta.[7] The decision does  not
resolve fundamental questions affecting the  period  between  1800  and  1813.  This  is  so
because the appointment of a governor  in  1813  is  compatible  with  the  confirmation  of
‘sovereignty’ which had transferred earlier but which, for political  reasons,  could  not  be
openly asserted.[8] In other words, the possibility exists that  ‘sovereignty’  had  vested  in
the British Crown prior this legal and political fact being acknowledged  in  1813.  Modern
commentators accept that there is no confident consensus on the issue of both the  moment
and the cause of British legal authority.[9]
NORMATIVE AND POSITIVE CONCEPTIONS OF LEGAL AUTHORITY
When considering the moment at which British officials had full legal authority to exercise
executive and legislative power in Malta it is best to avoid seeking a general  definition  of
‘sovereignty’ because of the contested nature of the term.[10]  For present purposes we are
considering the moment at which the British  Crown  enjoyed  a  convincing  claim  to  the
exclusive, legal, right to rule without attention to the claims of another state.  Such  a  legal
right is not sufficiently based on the simple fact of being capable of exercising  force.  The
exercise of force must be compatible with some reasonable  account  of  legitimacy  as  the
basis of legal authority. Generalising from accepted  positivist  legal  theory[11]  it  can  be
suggested that Britain would have legal authority  if  (i)  the  rules  which  are  accepted  in
Malta as legitimate for the governance of the territory (creating a  significant  and  weighty
obligation that they should be generally obeyed) derive their authority  from  an  hierarchy
of norms; (ii) this   hierarchy  culminates  unambiguously  in  British  political  institutions
(specifically the Crown and the Crown in Parliament) and  not  others;  and  (iii)   and  that
there is a presumption that the commands or rules which emanate from  them  ought  to  be
obeyed. It is not, therefore, a sufficient reason for the acceptance of the rules as  legitimate
that they are morally good or part of an efficient way  of  achieving  common  purposes;  a
necessary condition of legitimacy is their place within the hierarchical normative  structure
culminating in British institutions whose will ought to be obeyed.
             There  are  (at  least)  two  perspectives  on  this  issue.  First,  is   the   ‘normative’
approach.  This  recognises  legal  authority,  and  makes   it   legitimate,   in   terms   of   a
‘normative order’. [12] By ‘normative order’, in this context, is meant a hierarchy of  rules
which determine legal authority  and  condition  the  way  in  which  it  is  exercised.  As  a
normative order it displays ‘autopoiesis’ in the sense of being  self-referring;  each  rule  is
explained  in  terms  of  another,  also  valid,  rule.  The  perspective  does   not   require   a
particular individual, institutional will  or  political  fact,  which  is  outside  the  normative
framework  and  necessary,  as  it  were,   to   give   the   system   validity.[13]   From   this
perspective, the rules of international  law,  which  include  the  claims  of  the  Neapolitan
Crown, are centrally  important.  In  this  paper  the  opinions  of  Vattel  will  be  taken  as
representative of international  law.  This  work,  which  was  published  in  1758,[14]  was
considered  to  be  an  important  handbook  for  diplomats  by  the  end  of  the  eighteenth
century.[15]
The normative order can also include rules  of  domestic  law  in  so  far  as  they  serve  to
define and limit the exercise  of  power.  English  law  on  the  government  of  colonies  is
appropriately considered in this context.
             The  second  perspective  is  ‘positivist’.  On  this  account  legal  authority  is   not
ultimately dependent upon an order of rules but on certain  ascertainable  facts.  Following
classical positive legal theory[16],  Britain  would  exercise  full  legal  authority  in  Malta
from when (i) it does, in fact, exercise a monopoly of legitimate force, (ii)  it  does  not,  in
fact, accept the need to follow any other power, (iii) its rules are habitually obeyed  by  the
bulk of the people  and  (iv)  its  rules  are  obeyed  from  the  ‘internal  point  of  view’  by
officials. This last point means that the civil servants and judges accept that the application
of a rule emanating from Britain as a sufficient reason.  This  must  be  one  that  precludes
the  following  of  rules  from  other  sources,  or  reasons-all-things-considered,  for   their
decisions and actions.
            Each of these perspectives  will  be  utilised  in  the  discussion  that  follows.  Two
different  theses  or  explanations  for  British  legal   authority   will   be   considered:   the
‘conquest’ thesis and the ‘informal voluntary cession’ thesis. These theses explain the core
facts of the British acquisition of  power  in  Malta  in  different  ways  and  the  value  and
significance  of  these  explanations  will  be   evaluated   in   terms   of   the   two   general
perspectives on the nature of legal authority referred to above.
THE CORE FACTS.
The discussion interprets certain core facts of Maltese history at this period that  are  taken
to be uncontroversial.  In  1523  Charles  V,  Holy  Roman  Emperor  and  King  of  Sicily,
granted Malta and its dependencies, to the Knights of St  John  who  were  responsible  for
the government of the island from 1530. The terms of the  grant  included  a  clause  under
which the island would revert to the Sicilian Crown  if  it  were  abandoned  by  the  Order.
Suzerainty over Malta was retained by  the  King  of  Sicily  in  the  sense  that  the  annual
payment of a falcon was made as a feudal due, but,  in  reality  Malta,  under  the  Knights,
had the principal attributes of a sovereign state.[17]  In  June  1798  French  forces,  in  the
course of the ill-fated expedition to Egypt, landed in Malta and caused  the  withdrawal  of
the Knights from the island and from government. The  French  occupation  swiftly  led  to
discontent amongst Maltese people, particularly caused by the confiscation of  money  and
valuable property from the Church and also from  the  secular  institutions  of  the  treasury
and public bank, by taxation, and by military conscription. On  September  2nd  1798  there
was an organised insurrection led by  prominent  Maltese  and  supported  by  commanders
from the villages which caused the French to retire to  the  fortress  in  Valetta  where  they
were  besieged.  To  break  the  stalemate  the  Maltese  needed  assistance.  The   effective
assistance came from the British navy, commanded by Nelson who, first using  Portuguese
forces under his command and later elements  of  the  Royal  Navy,  provided  arms  and  a
blockade of the island. The siege continued and British influence increased with the  active
approval of a  significant  proportion  of  Maltese  leaders.  By  September  1799  a  British
officer, Sir Alexander Ball, was appointed by Nelson as ‘chief director of the  island’  with
final responsibility for  civil  government.  Ball’s  authority  at  this  time  was  that  of  the
Neapolitan, not the British, Crown. In December  1799  British  armed  forces,  a  force  of
about 1200 soldiers and marines, landed on Malta and so the administrative  presence  was
significantly bolstered. The besieged and blockaded French forces  eventually  surrendered
on the 5th of September 1800, but did  so  solely  to  the  British  military  commander,  Sir
Thomas  Pigot.  Maltese  representatives  and  Ball,  the  representative  of  the  Neapolitan
Crown, were excluded.
            Following the surrender, the  military  rule  under  Pigot  operated  in  parallel  with  Ball’s
continuing civil administration, the authority of  which,  at  least  nominally,  continued  to  be  the
Neapolitan Crown. Ball was recalled in February 1801. Fears of a solely  military  government  by
Britain  were  allayed  in  May  1801  when  Charles  Cameron,  described  in  the  Instructions  he
received from the British  Crown,  as  ‘civil  commissioner’,  was  appointed.  Sir  Alexander  Ball
succeeded Cameron in July 1802 but not as civil commissioner, rather as ‘minister plenipotentiary
to the Order of St John’. The context for this was that in March  1801  a  new  British  government
had opened peace negotiations with  the  French.  A  significant  term  of  the  resulting  Treaty  of
Amiens was the restoration of the Knights of St John to Malta.  A  Neapolitan  garrison,  intended,
by the Treaty, to replace British forces, arrived on Malta. The restoration of the Order was  deeply
opposed by many if not all significant opinion in Malta and on June 15th 1802  a  Declaration  of
Rights[18] was issued under the authority of  the  Congress  of  the  Islands  of  Malta  and
Gozo declaring that the ‘King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain  and  Ireland  is  our
Sovereign Lord, and his lawful successors shall, in all times to come, be acknowledged  as
our lawful sovereign’. The Treaty of Amiens was never implemented (a major dispute was
over  Malta)  and  the  war  resumed  in  May  1803.  At  that  time,  May  1803,  Ball  was
appointed ‘civil commissioner’ and he successfully  obtained  the  removal  of  Neapolitan
troops. Ball continued as civil commissioner in this,  his  second  administration,  until  his
death  in  October  1809.  His  successor  was  the   military   commander,   Major-General
Hildebrand-Oakes who was himself replaced in 1813 by Sir Thomas Maitland, the  first  to
be described by the British as ‘Governor’.
            Leading authorities on  Malta  disagree  on  the  interpretation  and  significance  of
these events. The  ‘formal  cession’  thesis  is  approved  in  Sammut  v  Strickland  and  by
Hardman.[19] According to this argument, the legal status of Malta position  only  loses  it
ambiguity in 1813 with  the  appointment  of  Thomas  Sir  Thomas  Maitland  as  the  first
official properly entitled to  be  called  ‘Governor’.  This  argument  is  flawed  because   it
poses  rather  than  resolves  the  question  with  which  we   are   concerned,   namely   the
entitlement of the British Crown in relation to Malta prior to that date.   For  this  reason  it
will not be discussed further.
What will here be called the ‘conquest thesis’  argues  that,  by  1800,   the  British  Crown
legally possessed a right to rule by right  of  military  conquest.  The  thesis  is  founded  in
particular   upon   evidence   that   the   French   forces   occupying   Valletta    surrendered
exclusively to the British.
  The  ‘voluntary-informal  cession’  thesis,  on  the  other  hand,  asserts  that  a  necessary
component to the British right to rule was a form of voluntary submission  by  the  Maltese
through their representatives; the Declaration of Right of 1802  being  the  most  important
expression of this consensual act. On this view the Maltese had obtained the right  to  cede
their country, through their own actions in expelling the French, who had, in turn, assumed
sovereignty on the basis of a conquest and the expulsion of the Order of St John.
CONQUEST
The conquest thesis was  adopted  by  the  contemporary  British  author,  Granville  Penn,
writing  in  1805.[20]  He  seems  to  have  considered  that  the  French  surrender  was   a
sufficient basis for full legal authority, [21] an authority that  was  confirmed  or  endorsed
by the consent (what he called the voluntary suffrage) of the population.
            Unsurprisingly, the conquest thesis was  adopted  by  British  officials  later  in  the
Nineteenth Century in the context of  preparing  the  constitutional  reforms  of  1836.  The
position accepted by Lord Glenelg, then the Secretary of State, was that, between conquest
and voluntary cession, the better view  of  the  acquisition  of  British  legal  authority  was
conquest (i.e. in 1800) confirmed by an act of cession by  the  Neapolitan  Crown  at  Paris
and Versailles in 1814 and 1815 respectively. It  was,  for  Lord  Glenelg,  the  better  view
because it involves a definite acquisition of sovereign power  not  open  to  the  constraints
and qualifications that can be read into any voluntary cession dependant on the consent  of
the Maltese.[22]
             The  argument  for  a  transfer  of  sovereignty  by  ‘conquest’  has  two  necessary
features. First, that the ‘right’ flows from the exercise of military  force  which  is  decisive
of  the  outcome  and  which  is  self-directed  in   the   sense   that   it   is   not   under   the
acknowledged authority of some other command. The question is whether something more
is required. In ‘Foltina’[23] British courts suggested that, as a  matter  of  British  law,  the
right to rule a territory was obtained from the moment  of  effective  military  control;  that
the ‘right’ and the power coincide with each other. Roberts-Wray, however,  suggests  that
some form of manifested intention to rule is also needed. An example of such an  intention
would  be  installation  of  an  effective   civil   government;   mere   military   rule   is   not
enough.[24]  International  law  may  be  more  demanding  in  that  sovereignty  can  only
transfer, lawfully, on the basis of  ‘subjugation’,  not  conquest  alone  but  through  formal
annexation after the cessation of hostilities.[25]
             In  what  follows  it  will  be  assumed  that  the  ‘conquest  thesis’  is  at  its   most
compelling when the fact of military control is linked to the manifestation  of  an  intention
to rule. The claims and credibility of the thesis will be discussed on that assumption.
Conquest: assessment
There is no doubt that British military forces, first the Royal Navy (from September  1798)
and the army (from December 1799), played an important role in  the  defeat  and  removal
of the French armed forces. The argument for conquest is that this role  was  decisive.  The
claim is that, but for the British interventions, the blockade of the French would have gone
on much longer and may even have  unsuccessful.  In  particular,  it  is  suggested  that  the
siege  had  the  seeds  of  disaster  within  it  unless  it  could  be  brought  to  a   successful
conclusion quite quickly. The siege relieved the French of their responsibilities to feed and
supply the population  but  made  it  easier  to  feed  and  supply  themselves.  Without  the
British  blockade  of  the  harbour  through  which  the  French  forces   sought   to   supply
themselves and, later, assistance in the land battle from British troops, the siege  may  have
become a burden on the Maltese greater than the  population  could  bear.[26]  The  British
claim to have been the decisive military force is focused on the blockade  which,  after  the
initial Portuguese involvement albeit on  British  instructions,  was  undertaken  by  British
forces.
            The claim of conquest is more challengeable in respect of the  role  of  British  land
forces. Maltese representatives,  it  seems,  regarded  these  forces  as  ‘auxiliaries’  simply
assisting  their  insurrection  and  conquest  of  most  of  the  island   from   the   French[27].
Furthermore, there was some belief that British troops hindered the action  by  abandoning
some of the ‘unhealthy’ forward posts and by desertion to the enemy;[28] and it was noted
that whilst the Maltese lost some 300 casualties during the siege, the  British  lost  none.  It
needs also to be remembered that from February 1800 Neapolitan troops were also present
in the Malta assisting the siege.[29]
            The claim that the role of the British armed forces was decisive is reinforced by the
fact that it was the British  commander,  Major-General  Pigot,  who  received  the  French
offer  of  terms  of  capitulation,  conducted  the  negotiations  and  agreed  and  signed  the
articles  of  capitulation  on  September  5th  1800.  In  these  negotiations  Pigot  made   no
reference either to Sir  Alexander  Ball  (then,  at  least  in  formal  sense,  representing  the
Neapolitan Crown[30]) or to Maltese representatives. The claim made by some  supporters
of the cession thesis,[31]  that  that  capitulation  was  signed  on  behalf  of  His  Britannic
Majesty ‘and his allies’, is not supported by the text.[32] The exclusion of  the  Neapolitan
and Maltese presence seems to  have  been  at  the  insistence  of  the  French  commander,
General Vaubois, who was reluctant to recognise either as a legitimate  power.[33]  Major-
General Pigot was content to accede  to  this  refusal.  His  view  was  consonant   with  the
conquest thesis. He later wrote: ‘The Maltese had certainly made great exertions and  were
entitled to a great  deal  of  merit  for  their  bravery  and  perseverance  yet,  with  all  their
exertions, could never have compelled the French  to  surrender  without  the  British  fleet
and army’.[34]
            Military victory and subsequent military control may, as  suggested  above,  not  be
sufficient for the acquisition of a right, of legal authority to  rule.  The  assumption  in  this
paper is that there must also be evidence of an  intention  to  rule.  A  manifestation  if  this
intention  may  not  only  include  the  establishment  of  a  civil  government  but  also   an
intention to exclude the claims of others, including a denial not just of the power of  others
but also of their right. If such actions are then effective in the sense  of  obtaining  habitual
obedience of the population and official rule-following from the ‘internal point of view’,  a
reasonable claim that can be made.
            The evidence is that the British military was, after the  French  surrender,  prepared
to act, with the authority of a conquering power,  i.e.  in  ways  that  implicitly  denied  any
duty to consult or deal with any other party. Apart from  the  bitterness  of  their  exclusion
from the surrender negotiations, the  Maltese  representatives  considered  that  the  British
ignored their interests in the way in which  the  removal  of  the  French  was  achieved.  In
particular, the British failed to take steps to secure compensation for the spoliation that had
been a feature of the French occupation. The British  did  not  accept  the  French  offer  of
hostages[35] as a guarantee for the repayment of monies taken by the from  the  Università
and other institutions, such as the Monte di Pieta; and they failed to insert any clause in the
Articles  of  Capitulation  indemnifying  the  private  property  rights  of  the   Maltese.[36]
Furthermore, the British furnished transports to carry the French garrison and its  spoils  to
French ports. The British attitude contributed to the political and administrative difficulties
that tainted the first decade of the British administration of the island.
             Evidence  of  an  intention  to  rule  to  the  exclusion  of  others  can  be  found  in
statements of intention, in the implications  of  actions,  and  from  the  way  in  which  the
formal rights of others were denied. Pigot’s  refusal  to  admit  the  Neapolitan  or  Maltese
interest into the surrender negotiations with the French has already been noted. At the time
of the negotiation he also ordered the lowering  of  the  Neapolitan  colours,  which,  under
Nelson’s supervision, had flown alongside the British flag.[37] As regards recognising  the
claims of the Maltese, which the British might have  been  expected  to  do  had  they  seen
themselves as acting in  merely  a  protective  role,   Pigot  dissolved  the  Congress  of  the
Maltese which Ball had convened during the siege in order to govern that part of the island
not occupied by the French. Pigot had been instructed that ‘…it was not proposed to  share
with other parties the advantages to be derived from the conquest of Malta’,[38] and, as he
later explained, his orders in relation to the capitulation were intended to ensure that Malta
could be regarded as a conquest of Britain.[39]  Ball, it seems, was of the same  view  and,
later, emphasised that his Congress was only formed  to  co-ordinate  the  activities  of  the
Maltese and preserve public order;[40]  it was not  a  revival  of  the  so  called  ‘Consiglio
Popolare’, nor was it intended to be a representative body exercising legislative powers  in
peace  time.[41]  More   generally,   and   despite   the   fact   that   he   was   formally   the
representative of the Neapolitan Crown, Ball, effectively  exercised  the  civil  government
between September  1799  and  February  1801.  He  pursued  policies  intended  to  obtain
Maltese support for British rule. Notably, he revived the institutions of the  government  as
well as the paternalist polices of the ancien regime.  Controversially, (because  of  the  cost
to the British taxpayer), he re-established the Università,  which  controlled   the  prices  of
staple foods; the Monte di Pietà, which  provided  cheap  finance,  was  also  reinstated;  as
well as  the hospitals to provide health care.[42]
            The most compelling evidence of  a  British  intention  to  take  on  sovereign  legal
authority for Malta following the military occupation  came  in  May  1801.  After  a  brief
period of exclusively military  rule  under  Pigot,  Charles  Cameron  was  appointed  ‘civil
commissioner’. Cameron’s letter  of  appointment  included  Royal  Instructions  in  which
Malta is  described  ‘as  a  dependence  of  the  Crown  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great
Britain….’. Other parts of the Instructions reveal that, for  the  British,  the  sovereignty  in
the island now  vested  in  the  Crown.  This  is  explicit,  for  example,  in  the  section  on
taxation: ‘a great part of the public  Revenue of the Island was derived under the  Order  of
St John  of  Jerusalem,  should  continue  to  be  managed  and  enforced  upon  the  former
footing with such alterations only as the Change of Circumstances  by  which  the  right  of
Sovereignty formerly vested in that order, but now exercised by His Majesty have rendered
obviously  requisite  (emphasis  added).’   These  words  make  it  clear   that   sovereignty,
‘formerly vested’ in the Order, had, by 14th May 1801,  transferred  to  the  British  Crown.
Earlier, in a treaty concluded between His Britannic Majesty and the Dey of Algiers  dated
19th March 1801 concerning the release of Maltese held in slavery, there  is  the  following
recital:
‘Whereas the Island of Malta has been conquered by His  Britannic  Majesty’s  arms,  it  is
now hereby agreed and fully concluded…that the inhabitants thereof shall be treated  upon
the same footing as the rest of His Britannic Majesty’s subjects, and  the  said  island  shall
be  considered  in  all  respects  like  the  other  places  subject   to   the   Crown   of   Great
Britain……’.[43]   The  Maltese  are  to  be  treated  like  other  British  subjects;  a   treaty
indicating less certainty as to the status of the Maltese would have required the Maltese  to
be treated ‘as if’ they were British subjects.  The  recital  also  records  the  official  British
view that Malta was acquired by conquest.[44]
             The  conquest  thesis  can  also  claim  habitual  obedience  from  the  bulk  of   the
population. There is no evidence of any actual revolt against  British  rule  though  there  is
evidence of serious dissatisfaction, threatening  revolt,  particularly  over  the  negotiations
leading to the preliminary Treaty of Amiens in the summer of 1801,[45]  as  well  as  fears
about its implementation a year later. The  point  of  such  dissatisfaction,  at  least  for  the
Maltese representatives, was  to  seek  proper  protection  from  the  British,  rather  than  a
rejection of British rule; nor was it a preference for  some  other  constitutional  settlement.
This desire was subsequently clearly manifested in the Declaration of Right 1802, which is
discussed below. The fact  that  the  Definitive  Treaty  of  Amiens  was  not  implemented
meant that the issue was not put to the test.
            As mentioned above,  a  defining  feature  indicating  the  factual  existence  (under
positivist legal theory) of a legal system and, therefore, the claim that  governance  is  law-
based, is that the officials follow the rules in question  ‘from  the  internal  point  of  view’.
British officials, nor surprisingly, followed instructions from London, and nowhere else, in
the  aftermath  of  the  establishment  of  British  military  and  civil  power.  This   is   best
illustrated in respect of Ball who followed British instructions despite  being  formally  the
legal representative of the Naples. It is  the  position  of  Maltese  officials  which  is  more
important. There is no  evidence  of  dissension  from  British  rule  other  than  during  the
period  of  the  Amiens  negotiations.  These  negotiations  did  raise  the  question  of   the
legitimacy of British  rule  not  only  for  political  representatives  but  also,  it  seems,  for
officials.[46] In fact the position of officials was not  really  put  to  the  test.  The  Amiens
problem disappeared in the late summer and Autumn of 1802 as the  British  reluctance  to
give effect to its terms became apparent. More importantly it was  British  policy  to  retain
Maltese occupancy of  a high proportion of civil  offices  and  to  revive  and  continue  the
long standing institutions of Maltese public life,[47] though the  number  of  British  office
holders increased significantly from 1803.[48]
             The  position  of  the  Maltese  judges  is  similar.  In  the  instructions  to   Charles
Cameron, in his letter of appointment of May 1801, it is made clear that there  is  to  be  no
imposition  of  British  law  but,  rather,  the  continuation  of   existing   Maltese   law.[49]
Following this. Cameron’s first proclamation to the Maltese people, of the 15th  July  1801,
promised to uphold  the  laws  and  to  respect  the  ‘dearest  rights’  of  the  Maltese,  their
persons,  property  and  holy  religion.[50]  For  example,  in  an  address  to   the   Maltese
judiciary on 11th December 1800, Lord Keith wrote that they were  under  the  ‘protection’
of the British nation;[51] a formula that conspicuously avoids an explicit claim as to where
legal sovereignty resided. The Maltese judiciary were not required  not  apply  the  laws  in
the name of the British Crown. The judges, therefore, are relieved of the need to deal  with
a conflict between British and Maltese law  and  can  follow  the  latter  ‘from  the  internal
point of view’ without contradicting any alleged obligation to British law.
             The  continuation  of  Maltese  law  is  also  a  requirement  under   the   normative
approach to the transfer of sovereignty or legal authority in a country.  Under  British  law,
the existing, non-British, legal system was retained for a conquered country ‘until they  are
altered by the conqueror’.[52] This is consistent with the complementary  assertion  of  the
right of the British Crown to alter the law as it saw fit and, in the case  of  Malta,  choosing
not to do so.[53] Local laws would be abrogated if they were inconsistent  with  an  Act  of
Parliament  extending  to  the  country  in  question,  or  if  they  were  ‘repugnant   to   the
fundamental  religious  or  ethical  principles  of   Europeans’.[54]   Continuation   by   the
conqueror  of  local  laws  is  also   consistent   with   ‘legal’   sovereignty   as   defined   in
international law. Vattel considered that international law limits a conqueror (for how long
is not made clear) to ruling on the basis of existing laws, where,  as  in  Malta,  the  quarrel
occasioning the conquest has been against a sovereign (here,  the  French  in  1799)  rather
than an aggressive people.[55]
            According to the ‘conquest’ thesis, therefore, the British Crown is exercising  legal
authority which is legitimate  from,  at  least  May  1801  when  the  intention  to  rule  was
manifested by the appointment of a civil commissioner. First  is  the  fact  of  unchallenged
military occupation on the basis of which British forces exercise  the  monopoly  of  force;
second, the evidence of the British intention to rule as sovereign, to the exclusion  of  other
claims; third, the fact of habitual obedience by  the  majority  of  the  population,  for  what
ever reason, to British  rule  (the  response  to  Amiens  was  to  seek  a  closer  union  with
Britain),  and,  fourth,  the  fact  that  at  least  the  most   senior   officials   followed   their
instructions ‘from the internal point of view’ as reasons  for  their  actions  (albeit  that  the
principle of continuity meant this was never tested) and that these instructions reflected the
will of the British Crown and no one else.
            But the  conquest  theory  has  to  explain  various  obfuscations  of  British  policy.
Conquest without an intention to rule as sovereign does not  create  a  convincing  case  for
the transfer of fully legitimate legal authority. The evidence of  Britain’s intention  to  rule,
given above, can be contrasted with a range of different signals of intention that the British
were giving out during the same period. For supporters of the ‘formal cession’ thesis, such
as Hardman, these obfuscations indicate the lack of clear  intention  on  the  issue  of  legal
authority. [56]
            Examples  of  such  obfuscations  are,  that  after  British  military  dominance  was
obtained various steps were taken, such as the lowering of the Neapolitan flag, that  appear
as denials of Neapolitan legal sovereignty. Nevertheless, there were assurances  made  that
this act did not imply offence to the Maltese, the Neapolitans  or  Russia;[57]  and  Britain,
through its ambassador in Naples, was claiming  that  there  was  no  decided  intention  of
permanent possession.[58]
            As regards the Maltese, there was a reluctance by the British to make any intention
to declare openly that the British were exercising sovereign authority. General Pigot’s first
proclamation to the Maltese, 19th February 1801, was similarly guarded.[59]  In July  1801
Cameron, the ‘civil  commissioner’  broached  the  idea  of  a  formal  declaration  that  the
Maltese were subjects of the British Crown, but this was resisted in a  way  that  suggested
that Britain continued to hedge its bets, particularly, as mentioned below, in the context  of
the Amiens negotiations.[60] In the Royal Instructions of  1813  to  Sir  Thomas  Maitland,
the first Governor of the Island, there appears the following:  ‘…the anxious  desire  which
the Maltese were understood to possess of being acknowledged publicly as subjects  of  the
British Crown has favoured the disposition of His Majesty’s Government  to  establish  the
civil authorities of the Island upon a permanent footing…’[61] (emphasis  supplied).  This,
of course, can be read as implying an earlier acquisition of a right to rule which has merely
lacked public acknowledgement, or of an earlier uncertainty as to the  right  to  rule  which
has now been resolved in favour of establishing a permanent government.
            The conquest thesis understands  these  matters  not  as  weakening  the  claim  that
legal sovereignty, in the sense of legal authority to rule, passed at least by May 1801 if not
September 1800, but  as  indicating  the  exercise  of  such  sovereignty.  The  obfuscations
indicate a political uncertainty not an uncertainty as to legal right. The positivist,  political,
conception of sovereignty is compatible with the idea that there can be legal limitations on
how it is exercised and so accepts the idea of holding legal authority in order to transfer  it.
Similarly  the  normative  conception  of  legal  authority  has  no  difficulty  with  a   bona
fide transfer of sovereignty which is short  lived  and  involves  a  further  transfer.  This  is
expressly  accepted,  by  British  law,  in  ‘The  Foltina’[62].  By  March   1801,   when   the
Addington Ministry took office in London, Britain was preparing to  enter  negotiations  at
an international level in which it would deliver up the island to the Order of  St  John,  and
so any clear assertion of sovereignty, at the diplomatic  level  or  publicly  to  the  Maltese,
would  have,  on  balance,   increased   political   difficulties.   The   policy   of   temporary
occupation became obvious in the terms of the Preliminary Treaty of Amiens concluded in
October  1801.  In  this  agreement  the   British   government   undertook   to   permit   the
restoration of the  Order  of  St  John  to  Malta  under  the  protection  of  the  Russia.  The
Definitive Treaty, by contrast, reflected determined and effective Maltese opposition to the
terms of the preliminary Treaty[63] at least to the extent that Article  X,  though  continuing
to provide for the restoration of the Order, also required  the  neutrality  of  the  island,  the
withdrawal of British  civil  and  military  authorities,  the  establishment  of  a  Neapolitan
garrison (intended  to  be  present  only  until  the  Order  could  raise  sufficient  forces  to
garrison the Islands[64]) and, in particular,  enhanced  the  political  rights  for  the  Maltese,
particularly in so far as the Grand master of the Order  was to be elected from amongst  the
native Maltese. Under the conquest thesis these are simply  political  questions  concerning
the future of the island and should not be conflated with the question of  the  legal  right  to
rule: the two are distinct issues.
            Subsequent events, under the conquest  thesis,  simply  reinforce  the  claim  that  a
legitimate, legal right to rule had passed to Britain at least by May 1801. In June  1802  Sir
Alexander Ball had been appointed as the minister plenipotentiary to the Order of  St  John
under instructions to implement the Treaty by arranging for the  evacuation  of  the  British
forces and their replacement by Neapolitans[65]. Upon  his  arrival  on  10th  July  1802  he
took  over  from  Cameron  and,  without   the   title,   exercised   the   functions   of   Civil
Commissioner. Neapolitan forces arrived in when. But by the Autumn of 1802 there  were
developing British doubts about the advisability of  implementing  the  Treaty  of  Amiens.
These were caused by Russia’s refused to guarantee the neutrality of  1sland,  by  fear  that
the ultimate outcome of the Treaty would be  the  re-acquisition  of  Malta  by  the  French
because the Neapolitans were effectively in the hands of France, and by continued  French
expansion on matters not covered by the Treaty, such as the annexation of Piedmont in the
Autumn of 1802. This  expansion  could  be  counterbalanced  by  Britain  using  Malta  to
strengthen its strategic presence in the Mediterranean and better protect the route to  India.
Despite  the  recognition,  in  his  title,  of  Neapolitan  sovereignty,  Ball  clearly  took  his
instructions from London and exercised his powers on that basis. Secret  instructions  were
sent to Ball in October 1802  ordering  him  to  suspend  the  evacuation  of  British  forces
altogether,[66] and Ball refused to admit the Grand Master when he insisted  on  travelling
to Malta to take possession of the government in accordance with the Treaty. The evidence
that Britain was not complying  with  the  Treaty  in  respect  of  Malta  was  the  principal,
ostensible, reason for the renewal of  hostilities  in  May  1803.  Ball  was  appointed  Civil
Commissioner in May 1803 and immediately instructed the removal of  Neapolitan  forces
from the Island. This was so  because domination of the Kingdom of Naples  by  Napoleon
meant that accepting Neapolitan rights over Malta would have been tantamount to handing
control to the French.  These actions  are  an  unequivocal  denial  of  both  politically  and
legally based sovereignty over Malta by the Neapolitan Crown. Under the  conquest  thesis
such a denial is consistent with  the  fact  and  right  of  Britain  to  exercise  proper,  legal,
authority in Malta, a right which has been convincingly established since 1801.
            In summary the conquest argument is that effective military control  (the  ability  to
exercise the monopoly of force) was with British forces from  September  1800  and  there
was a clear intention to rule at least  by  the  appointment  of  Cameron  in  charge  of  civil
government in May 1801. Senior officials regarded the British  Crown  as  source  of  final
authority. Obfuscations in British policy are indications  of  perfidiousness  or  of  political
but not legal uncertainty and the policies underlying the Treaty of Amiens are exercises  of
sovereignty, not reasons for doubting its existence. The limited  concern  demonstrated  by
the British for the views of the Maltese and their representatives  illustrates  the  behaviour
of a conquering sovereign rather than a protector or occupier  with  delegated  and  limited
powers. Of course, a difficult legal test was avoided by the early decision to continue  with
existing Maltese laws and institutions.  This  was  not  only  removed  the  likelihood  of  a
conflict between British and Maltese law coming before the Maltese courts, thus  requiring
the judges to  disclose  their  constitutional  allegiances,  but  is  also  compatible  with  the
norms appropriate to a conqueror of an enemy  power  a  distinct  from  an  enemy  people.
Under the conquest thesis this policy  of  continuity  pursued  by  British  administrators  is
thus an important signifier of the transfer of sovereignty rather than the converse.
Voluntary Informal Cession
A strong proponent of  the  voluntary  informal  cession  thesis  is  Roberts-Wray.[67]  His
principal argument is that the British Crown acquired Malta following a voluntary  cession
by its people in 1802.  The  position  is  also,  of  course,  the  preferred  view  of  both  the
Maltese  and  British  courts,  in  the  Twentieth   Century,   as   expressed   in   Sammut   v
Strickland[68] and, following that case, it is endorsed by Halsbury’s Laws of England.[69]
 There was also strong assertion of the voluntary cession  thesis  by  contemporaries.  Thus
elected Deputies in a  ‘Humble  Representation  of  the  Deputies  of  Malta  and  Gozo’  in
October  1801,[70]  referred  to  how  they  ‘gave  up  their  country’  (or   ‘consigned   the
government’) to the British and obeyed the British generals who they treated as  ‘ministers
of the  sovereign  their  hearts  had  elected’.  The  central  document  on  which  voluntary
cession is based is the Declaration of Rights of July 1802, signed by Maltese deputies. The
British   maverick   official,   William   Eton,    who    campaigned    against    the    British
administration and supported a restoration of Maltese governmental traditions, also argued
for cession[71]. The voluntary cession thesis was also strongly asserted, to the irritation  of
British government officials, by Chief Justice Stoddart in his reports of 1836.[72]  Maltese
constitutional theory is also predominantly supportive of the voluntary cession thesis.[73]
Informal Voluntary Cession, assessment.
The argument for voluntary informal cession is an argument of  right  in  the  sense  that  it
does not, like the argument for conquest, depend upon the fact of having power  and  being
obeyed. Rather the argument is that informal voluntary cession is the best interpretation, in
normative terms, of the  fact  that,  in  the  early  years  of  the  nineteenth  century,  British
officials, obeying instructions from London,  were  habitually  obeyed  by  the  Maltese  in
general, and officials in particular, in ways that indicate that  a  transfer  of  legal  authority
had taken place.
            Voluntary informal cession requires there to be a  polity  for  the  Maltese,  through
there representatives, to cede. There are  two  possibilities  canvassed.  One  is  that  Malta,
under the Order, already had the attributes  of  sovereignty.[74]  This  sovereignty  may  or
may not have passed to the French after their occupation or conquest in 1798. In any event
it was restored to the Maltese by their role in the siege and was then ceded  to  the  British.
The other is that Malta remained, during French occupation, under the formal  sovereignty
of the Neapolitan Crown, but that the failure of  Naples  to  protect  the  Maltese  from  the
French left the Maltese free, a  natural  right  recognised  by  international  law,  to  protect
themselves in the most effective way open to them-a form of sovereignty.
            United Kingdom law recognises informal voluntary cession[75].  International  law
is not so clear but does not expressly deny it, Grotius is thought to have recognised a  form
of  informal  cession,  though  the  passage  cited  requires  the   consent   of   the   ultimate
sovereign,[76] in this case Naples.  Consent to British protection for  Malta  was  given  by
Naples  in  February  1799;  but  this  is  not  the  same  as   ceding   sovereignty.   Vattel’s
understanding of international law was that a state overcome by force and unable to obtain
protection from its sovereign, is free to provide for  its  own  safety  without  regard  to  its
sovereign’s will.[77]
            Cession, as a thesis explaining the  legitimacy  of  British  rule  (the  acceptance  of
British authority to rule as a matter of law and subject to the claims of  no  others),  cannot
explain an unconditional transfer of the right to rule to Britain; it cannot explain a  state  of
affairs  in  which  the  Maltese  are  to  enjoy  equality  with   British   subjects   under   the
constitutional law of the United  Kingdom.  According  to  the  thesis,  voluntary  informal
cession is justified by reference to facts which indicate a highly conditional attitude by  the
Maltese to their subordination to Britain. In particular the Declaration of Rights June 1802,
which is seen as the central moment of voluntary cession,[78] is clearly conditional. In it a
Congress of the islands of Malta  and  Gozo[79],  declared  that  ‘the  King  of  the  United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland is our  Sovereign  Lord,  and  his  lawful  successors
shall, in all  times  to  come,  be  acknowledged  as  our  lawful  sovereign.’  However,  the
transfer of sovereignty is conditional upon the satisfaction of  a  range  of  demands  which
include the following: that Britain has ‘no right to cede these Islands to any power’ (clause
2);  that there should be a Maltese constitution established which is to  be  binding  on  and
limiting of the power of the British government (clause 3), and that the  power  of  taxation
and legislation should, subject to British consent, be with  the  Consiglio  Popolare  (clause
5).
            Under the conquest thesis (or any view which denies the foundational  significance
of the Declaration) the  Declaration  of  Right  is  best  read,  not  as  a  document  granting
sovereignty, but as a reminder to the British of their obligations as  (already,  by  conquest)
sovereign. Under a ‘Hobbesian’ account, in particular, sovereignty is unlimited other  than
by the duty of  the  sovereign  to  protect  his  people  from  lawlessness  and  civil  war.  If
nothing else, the Declaration might be  thought  of  as  a  reminder  of  this  principle.  The
Declaration of Rights stemmed from Maltese nationalist concerns at being sold-out  to  the
Order (and indirectly, through the Order’s weakness, to the French) by the British  through
the Treaty of Amiens. It was written at a time when  the  sacrifice  of  the  Maltese  for  the
greater  good  of  international  peace[80]   was   within   the   British   contemplation   and
consequential insurrection was threatened by some Maltese leaders.[81]
             The  more  obvious  objection  to  the  claim  that  the  Declaration  of  Rights  is  a
foundational source of British legal authority is that it is there is no evidence of acceptance
of its conditions by the British. On the contrary, the British  seemed  to  have  ruled  Malta,
certainly from the time of Cameron’s appointment as Civil  Commissioner  in  May  1801,
independently of Maltese interests as expressed through their representatives. In particular,
the  British  government  steadfastly  refused  to  contemplate  creating  either   a   Maltese
legislative or consultative assembly after the siege.[82]   British  rule  in  this  early  period
was characterised  by  institutional  rebuilding  and  continuity,  which  hardly  indicates  a
disinterested British concern to advance Maltese interests since it’s  primary  purpose  was
to cement Maltese loyalty to the British Crown.[83]
            Under the international  law  of  the  time,  the  Declaration  can  read  more  like  a
request for protection rather than the transfer of sovereignty. From this a possibly  stronger
version of the voluntary informal  cession  thesis  emerges.  Vattel  argued  that  there  was
legal recognition at international law for a request for protection from a stronger state by  a
weaker state,  including  where  the  formal  legal  sovereign  was  unable  or  unwilling  to
provide protection.[84] This voluntary subjection may be ‘on certain conditions  agreed  to
by  both  parties;  and  the  compact  or  treaty  of  submission  will  thenceforward  be  the
measure and the rule of the rights of each’. If the protector state fails in its engagements, it
loses what rights it may have had over the protected state and the latter resumes its former,
albeit vulnerable, independence and liberty. A similar consequence follows if the protector
state  goes  beyond  its  powers  in  the  compact  and  claims  greater  authority  than   was
agreed.[85] However, if the weaker, protected, state acquiesces expressly,  or  by  inaction,
then,  over  time,  the   continuing,   over-reaching   authority   of   the   protector   state   is
legitimated:  ‘patient  acquiescence  becomes  in  length   of   time   a   tacit   consent   that
legitimates the right of the usurper’[86]. On this  view  the  unconditional  British  right  to
rule dates from the time the Treaty of Amiens  had  been  set  aside;  in  respect  of  British
intentions  this  was  by  Autumn  1803.  From  that   time,   on   this   view,   the   Maltese
representatives no longer threatened rebellion and, though objecting  on  political  grounds
to a range of British decisions, may be said to have acquiesced in the British right  to  rule,
even though important terms of the Declaration of Right 1802 had not been put into effect.
It  is  suggested  that  this  is  a  more  convincing  explanation  of  the  thesis  of   informal
voluntary cession than one based on  the  Declaration,  though  it  is  one  that  has  a  more
indeterminate date, certainly later than July 1802.
            By delaying the moment in which sovereignty passes until July 1802,  the  Autumn
of 1803 or later, the informal voluntary cession thesis has a  different  explanation  for  the
obfuscations, the vicissitudes, of British policy from after the French surrender. Where, for
the conquest thesis, this is explained in terms of the  exercise  of  sovereignty,  the  cession
thesis explains it in terms of British uncertainty about whether  or  not  a  transfer  of  legal
authority had taken place.  rights  and  obligations,  not  just  as  uncertainty  as  to  how  to
exercise sovereign power. The informal voluntary cession thesis also  explains  the  British
policy of maintaining existing Maltese laws and institutions  as,  again,  a  consequence  of
the British position as protector, not as sovereign.
            Britain did agree to uphold the existing laws and  regulations  applicable  in  Malta,
though, as indicated above, the official statements about this do not involve a  promise  not
to change the laws, nor an undertaking to alter them only with the consent  of  the  Maltese
through their representatives. The cession theory explains the  intention  to  preserve  legal
continuity as Britain performing, from 1800, a protective rather  than  sovereign  role,  and
this interpretation can be reinforced by  the  fact  that,  under  Cameron’s  instructions,  the
civil and criminal laws are only to be  changed  if,  in  the  view  of  the  military,  they  are
required for safety and defence or if the changes are ‘evidently beneficial and desirable, as
to leave no doubt of [the change’s] expediency or of it  being  generally  acceptable  to  the
wishes, feelings and even prejudices of the inhabitants’. The administration of justice  was
to continue ‘in conformity to the Laws, and Institutions of the ancient  Government  of  the
Order…’ though here Britain did seem to reserve  an  unqualified  right  to  make  changes
ordered from London or, ordered locally in respect of ‘unforeseen emergencies’ (the  latter
needed to be reported to London).[87]
            However, maintaining  legal  continuity  can  also  be  explained  in  ways  that  are
consistent with the conquest thesis since, as we have seen,  maintaining  the  continuity  of
the  laws  of  the  conquered  people  is  a  requirement  of  the  normative   conception   of
sovereignty by conquest. The British conquest, if such it be, was for  self-defence  and  the
quarrel was with a usurper (the French). Where there  is  no  quarrel  with  the  people,  the
right of conquest is to dispossess the usurper but then ‘to rule according to the laws  of  the
state’-so long as the people voluntarily submit.[88] As we have stated, British officials,  in
maintaining the laws, were doing no more than that which international law, as they  might
have understood it, required of  a  conqueror.[89]  Maintenance  of  the  laws  was  also,  at
least,  the  starting  point  for  the  right  of  conquest  of  a  settled  people   under   English
constitutional law.  Of course, consistent with this is the right to legislate if the  conqueror,
Britain, so chooses, and this right to legislate is  only  restricted  by  reference  to  Britain’s
constitutional  laws  on,  for  example,  the   scope   of   the   Royal   Prerogative.[90]   The
maintenance of the existing laws of the conquered  country  is  either  a  legal  duty  of  the
conqueror  or  merely  an  act  of  prudence  aimed  at   minimising   popular   dissent   and
constitutional  dilemmas  for  the  Maltese  judges.  It  is  as  reasonable  to  interpret  legal
continuity as an act of sovereignty as it is to interpret it as evidence  of  the  recognition  of
another’s sovereignty. The issue was not tested  in  the  courts  by  a  case  challenging  the
vires of British officials to change the existing laws.
CONCLUSION
This article has focused  on  the  problem  of  establishing  the  most  convincing  basis  for
Britain’s legal right to rule  in  Malta  at  the  beginning  of  the  Nineteenth  Century.  It  is
suggested that there are convincing reasons for acknowledging  that the British Crown was
the legitimate and sole law making authority  (the  sovereign)  from,  at  latest,  July  1801.
This  claim  of  legitimacy  is  based  upon  interpreting  the  historical  events  against  the
measure of main-stream positivist legal theory.  This  theory  identifies  a  legal  system  in
terms  of  an  hierarchical  body  of  rules  culminating  in  a  commanding  sovereign  or  a
politically accepted constitutional rule; and this  body  of  rules  is  habitually  obeyed  (for
whatever reason) by the bulk of the population and accepted as a necessary  and  sufficient
reason for action by officials. It is also suggested that legitimate rule from this date is  also
compatible  with  the  broader  normative  structure  by  which  sovereignty  is  defined  in,
particularly, international law. The view  is  strengthened,  it  has  been  suggested,  by  the
weakness of the contrary claim of informal voluntary cession; the  central  point  of  whose
weakness  is  its  dependence  on  consent  by  the  Maltese   which   was   conditional   but
acceptance  by  the  United  Kingdom  of  a  power  to  rule   which   was   constitutionally
unconditional. The ‘obfuscations’ of British rule in this early period (such  as  a  refusal  to
give the Maltese a clear statement of their status and continuing to give  assurances  to  the
Neapolitan court that its legal title was not compromised) are, on this view, manifestations
of Britain’s political interests rather than  uncertainties  as  to  its  legal  and  constitutional
rights.
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